International Organizations and Internal Conditionality

In retrospect, NATO and EU enlargements can be viewed as easy; they admitted states that wanted to be involved and were lavishly rewarded. In contrast, this study explores the harder politics waged by the much larger regional organizations, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These organizations lack material incentives or instruments of coercion, instead having to work on the basis of shared values. They also face a variety of threats from recalcitrant members. In this book, Fawn uniquely uses internal conditionality to explain how these organizations have cleverly and subtly responded to such difficulties. Drawing on interviews in a range of post-communist countries and with practitioners inside and outside the organizations, the diverse case studies in this book examine issues of conflict, democratization, the death penalty, rewarding high office and retaining institutional membership. Fawn explores how international organizations which lack powers of compulsion can respond to threatening member-states and offers practical lessons for the international promotion of norms. This book will appeal to those interested in how international underdogs work and win in tough circumstances, as well as scholars of International Relations, Central and Eastern European Studies, Post-Soviet Studies and European Security.