Does the U.S. Army Really Understand Operational War? a Logistics Perspective

This monograph explores the extent to which logistics influences operational war. It focuses on the inelastic relationship between logistics and operations at levels beyond tactics, the role of logistics in determining operational courses of action, and upon the doctrinal implications which are generated by logistics' rediscovered importance. A theoretical model of operational war, together with historical examples from the twentieth Century are used to demonstrate the dominant role logistics plays in the planning and execution of operational campaigns. The paper questions whether current United States Army doctrine, which emphasizes the sequencing of engagements, correctly reflects the true nature of operational war. The author argues that the operational level of war is, in fact, the logistics level of war. As such, logistics cannot be subordinated to operations as is the case so frequently at the tactical level. Highlighted in this study is the significant impact which both friendly and enemy logistics considerations exert upon operational decisionmaking. The author concludes that there exists a very inelastic relationship between operations and logistics beyond the tactical level, and that successful operational commanders of the Twentieth Century understood this relationship. He proposes a greater integration of logistics into the heart of the U.S. Army's operational war fighting doctrine as we increase efforts to train future operational commanders and staff officers.