Deception and the Operational Level of War

In the years since WWII the subject of deception has received scant attention in the U.S. Army when compared to other subjects relating to warfighting. Consequently our doctrine for deception lags behind other developments, especially at the operational level of war. FM 100-5 emphasizes that an integral part of any campaign plan is a deception plan. With the resurgent emphasis on the operational level of war it is important that deception get a thorough review as an essential operational level combat multiplier distinct from tactical and strategic level deception operations. The intent of this monograph is to identify some essential requirements for deception operations at the operational level and suggest some rudimentary doctrinal imperatives for the use of deception in support of a campaign. To accomplish this three successful operational level deceptions from WWII are used: Sicily (Operation Husky), Ardennes (Wacht am Rhein) and Belorussia (Operation Bagration). This monograph contends that these three campaigns provide valuable lessons for the conduct of operational deception and are valuable in determining what the requirements and imperatives are for successful deception operations. The monograph establishes that the operational level deception is indeed distinct from the tactical and strategic level deception due to the factors of time, space and resources available in large unit operations. Due to these factors of size and scope the operational level deception requires special attention in several areas: planning, intelligence support, security and resources. These areas are analyzed in light of the historical examples to establish the actual nature of the activities that take place in each area. Following the analysis some doctrinal imperatives are suggested for deception operations at the operational level. The monograph also considers the implications of these findings for current doctrine, training, organization and equipment.